Julian Lünser obtained a B.A. in Liberal Arts and Humanities at Charles University, Prague, an M.A. in Philosophy at KU Leuven, and an M.A. in German and French Philosophy of the Master ErasmusMundus program, during which he studied at Charles University, Prague and Université Toulouse II Jean-Jaurès. His work is focused on Husserl’s phenomenology, particularly on the notions of horizon, passivity, intersubjectivity, and genetic analysis. Since 2021, he has been one of the two editors-in-chief of the academic journal AUC Interpretationes.
E-Mail: julian.luenser[at]gmail.com
More information: https://artes.phil-fak.uni-koeln.de/forschung/dissertationsprojekte-im-integrated-track/profilseiten-it/4928
Research Project
The concept of internalization denotes how the socially shaped environment is relevant for the emergence and development of patterns of thinking and action. While in a traditional account, it is typically understood passively, e.g. as social structures imposing certain patterns of thinking and action on the individual, in the contemporary social sciences more weight is put on the active participation of the individual in question. Internalization plays a crucial, if implicit role in different social sciences to the extent that it explains why ways of acting and thinking can diverge strongly between different times and places.
This project attempts to develop a phenomenological concept of internalization, mobilizing mainly resources from Edmund Husserl’s genetic phenomenology. The added value of introducing genetic phenomenology into the discussion on internalization lies in its double aim of, on one hand, resisting any naturalistic attempts to understand internalization as an interaction of passive or unconscious forces while, on the other hand, taking up the challenge of conceptualizing the subject as embedded in a social context. Concretely, a genetic phenomenology of internalization would describe the transcendental laws of motivation that govern the institution (“Stiftung”) of certain ways of apprehension (“Auffassung”), depending on the corresponding experiential history – a personal history that is always shared with others. In other words, because Husserl’s analyses of experience and particularly of perception show that the perceptual object is co-constituted by sedimented horizons, our experience is necessarily mediated by the past – but this does not mean that reality or our access to it turns into an illusion. Rather, a reflection on how our own horizons, types, and habitualities have been shaped in our interactions with others – “have been learned” – is possible and can open up new ways of thinking and action.
It is the ambition of this project to relate such a genetic-phenomenological concept of internalization back to the approach of the social sciences, not only to criticize naturalistic tendencies but more broadly to show the fruitfulness of a dialogue between the social sciences and phenomenology. For instance, Husserl’s phenomenology is well-suited to emphasize the deep-seated relevance of social experiences for even basic conceptions of the world. Last but not least, the evidence collected in the social sciences is at the same time an important test of the phenomenological conceptualizations and their ability to seize concrete experiences in their variety.
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Jagna Brduzińska